Restricted to first-order formulas, the rules of inference in the Curry-Howard type theory are equivalent to those of first-order predicate logic as formalized by Heyting, with one exception: ∃-elimination in the Curry-Howard theory, where ∃x : A.F (x) is understood as disjoint union, are the projections, and these do not preserve firstorderedness. This note shows, however, that the Curry-Howard theory is conservative over Heyting's system.
The meaning of the title becomes clear if we take the intuitionistic meaning of the logical constants to be given in Curry-Howard type theory, CH. This is the basic theory of types built up by means of ∀ and ∃, as outlined in [Howard, 1980] and presented in some detail by Martin-Löf, for example in [Martin-Löf, 1998 ], as part of his intuitionistic theory of types. The quantifier ∀ denotes in this system the operation of taking cartesian products ∀x : A.F (x) = Π x:A F (x) and ∃ denotes the operation of taking disjoint unions ∃x : A.F (x) = Σ x:A F (x).
First-order formulas can be regarded as formulas of CH and the intuitionistic rules of inference are all derivable, as rules of term formation, in CH. But the converse is not true: there are, for example, closed normal terms of CH whose types are first-order formulas, but which are not first-order proofs. This has to do with the rule of existential quantification elimination in CH, which expresses the intended meaning of the existential quantifier as disjoint union:
p : ∃x : D.F (x) ⇒ p1 : D, p2 : F (p1)
where t : A means that t is an object of type A or, equivalently, a proof of A. Even when D is the type of individuals and ∃x : D.F (x) is a first-order formula, providing that x occurs in F (x), F (p1) is not a first-order formula.
In intuitionistic logic as formalized by Heyting, which we denote by HL, this rule of existential quantifier elimination can be replaced by
The aim of this paper is to show that, in spite of the stronger form of existential quantifier elimination in CH, every first-order formula deducible in CH is also deducible in HL.
2
In order to treat the full system of HL, we include disjunction among the operations of CH. Disjunction is also a disjoint summing operation, but it cannot be formalized as such in CH without the introduction of further proposition and propositional function constants. For example, with the introduction of the type N of natural numbers it can be defined by In fact, it would suffice to introduce just the two-element type, together with a propositional function defined on it whose values are the absurd proposition 0 for one element and ¬0 for the other; but we will be content here to simply stick to the usual, unsatisfactory, formalization of disjunction.
The System CH
The formulas, terms and the relation of definitional equivalence ≡ must be simultaneously defined.
The relation constants in CH are either propositional constants or are constants for propositional functions on A, for some sentence, i.e. formula without free variables, A. No further kind of relation symbols are needed. For example, one might want also to consider the case of symbols A, F and G, where A denotes a type, F a propositional function on A and G a propositional function of two variables, such that Gab is defined when a : A and b : F a. But we can simply regard G as a propositional function on ∃x : A.F x, since (a, b) is of this type. The atomic formulas are the propositional constants and the expressions Et, where E denotes a propositional function on A and t is a term of type A. Among the propositional constants will be 0, denoting the absurd proposition (i.e. the initial or null type). Since we are concerned with pure logic, there will be no constants for objects of atomic type. (Individual and function constants in the language of first-order logic can be represented by free variables.)
For each formula A we assume given an infinite supply of symbols, called the free variables of sign A. We denote these variables by v A , or when the sign is given by the context or is irrelevant, by v. For distinct formulas A and B, the free variables of sign A are distinct from those of sign B. Note that A is not a part of the syntax of v A , which is an atomic symbol. (It would suffice to introduce variables v A only for normal formulas A. See below for the definition of normality.) If F (v A ) and A are formulas not containing x, then ∀x : A.F (x) and ∃x : A.F (x) are formulas. x is called a bound variable and has no type. Its meaning is given only in the context of the quantifier ∀x : A or ∃x : A or the lambda operator λx : A (see below) which binds it. (So, when v A actually occurs in F (v A ), F (x) is not a formula. Similarly, if v A actually occurs in the term t(v A ), then t(x) is not a term. ) If A and B are formulas, then so is A ∨ B.
Abbreviations:
A → B := ∀x : A.B
A ∧ B := ∃x : A.B where x does not occur in B.
The terms and their types are as follows:
Every variable of sign A is a term of type A.
For 0 we have only the rule of
∨-elimination
If v A does not occur in C or in the sign of any free variable in s(v A ) and v B does not occur in C or in the sign of any free variable in t(v B ), then
and, to repeat,
≡, defined below, is an equivalence relation on the set of terms and formulas.
t : A, A ≡ B ⇒ t : B expresses that the types of a term form an equivalence class. It also turns out that s ≡ t, s : A ⇒ t : A Terms and formulas that can be obtained from one another by renaming bound variables will be identified. The components of a term are as follows: a variable has no components; t is a component of
and t(v A ) is a component of λx : A.t(x) , where v A is the least variable of sign A not occurring in λx : A.t(x). (We assume that there is a fixed enumeration of variables.) The components of a formula are as follows: atomic formulas have no components, the components of A∨B are A and B, and the components of ∀x : A.F (x) and ∃x : A.F (x) are A and F (v A ), where v A is the least variable of sign A not occurring in ∀x : A.F (x). The subterms of a term t form the least set M containing t and containing all components of terms in M . A subterm s of a term t is not in general a part of t. Rather, it will correspond to parts s (x 1 , . . . , x n ) (n ≥ 0) of t, called instances of s in t, where s = s(v 1 , . . . , v n ). It is understood that the x i are distinct and the v i are distinct and the v i do not occur in t. When we wish to speak of an occurrence of a subterm of t as a part of t, we shall refer to it as a subterm part of t.
The Conversion Rules define the left-hand term by means of the righthand term.
where u is a term or is 1 or 2.
[λx :
We say that s initially converts to t 
Definition
The relations s n − RED t (s n-reduces to t) s RED t (s reduces to t) between terms is defined for n > 0 by
• If s i − CON V t, then s 1 − RED t.
• If t(v 1 , . . . v n ) is a matrix and r i 1 − RED s i (i = 1, . . . n), then t(r 1 , . . . r n ) 1 − RED t(s 1 , . . . , s n ).
• If r1 − REDs and sn − REDt, then rn + 1 − REDt.
• s n − RED t for some n iff s RED t.
s > t will mean that p RED t for some p obtained by replacing an occurrence of a subterm q of s by r, where q CON V r. (So s > t implies s RED t, but because of the first clause in the definition of RED, the converse does not always hold. The two fundamental theorems concerning CH are:
CHURCH-ROSSER THEOREM r RED s, t ⇒ there is a u such that s, t RED u WELLFOUNDEDNESS THEOREM Every sequence
COROLLARY Every term reduces to a unique normal term (i.e. a term which cannot be strictly reduced)-its normal form.
Now we complete our definition of the terms and their types by defining s ≡ t ⇐⇒ there is a u such that s, t RED u A ≡ B ⇐⇒ they are built up in the same way from pairwise ≡ terms.
≡ is obviously decidable equivalence relation between both terms and formulas. From now on, we will speak of the type of a term t of CH, meaning the unique normal type of t.
The simple terms of CH are variables or of one of the forms
where, in the third case, s and t are of course lambda-terms. Every term t can be written uniquely as
where n ≥ 0, t 0 is simple and each of t 1 , . . . t n is either 1, 2 or a term. Note that when t is normal and n > 0, then t 0 must be a variable. (It is to ensure this that the conversion rules for N (A, s)t and [r, s, t]u are needed, as Frank Pfenning pointed out to me.)
Proof of the Church-Rosser Theorem
In what follows, we just write N (t) for N (A, t), [t] 
The proof is by induction on s. If s is one of the terms t i , then there is nothing to prove. So let
is the result of substituting the t i 's for the t i 's in the p j 's. By the induction hypothesis, p j 1 − RED p j for each j, from which the result follows by definition. 2
Lemma 2 Let r CON V s and r 1 − RED t. Then there is a term u such that s 1 − RE u and t 1 − RED u.
The proof is by induction on r.
If s = t or r = t, set u = s and if r = s, set u = t. So we assume that r, s and t are distinct. This implies that r does not convert to t. It follows that t is obtained by replacing subterms of r by terms to which they 1-reduce.
We can assume e = 1, the other case being exactly the same. So s = r 1 (r 0 ) and t = [[r 0 ] e , λxr 1 (x), λxr 2 (x)], where the r j 's are obtained by replacing subterms of the r j 's by terms to which they 1-reduce. Set u = r 1 (r 0 ).
Lemma 3 Let r 1 − RED s and r 1 − RED t. Then there is a term u such that s 1 − RED u and t 1 − RED u.
Proof by induction on r. Let r = r 0 · · · r n , where r 0 is simple. The 1-reduction of r to s is called internal iff s = s 0 · · · s n , where s 0 is simple and r i 1 − RED s i for each i. If the 1-reduction is not internal, we call it external.
Case 1. The 1-reductions of r to s and t are both internal. Then s = s 0 · · · s n and t = t 0 · · · t n , where r i 1-reduces to both s i and t i for each i. Assume n > 0. Then the induction hypothesis applies to yield, for each i, a u i such that both s i and t i 1-reduce to u i . Then s and t 1-reduce to
If n = 0, then r = r 0 is a simple term N (r ), [r ] , [r , r , r ], (r , r ) or λxr (x) and the result follows easily by the induction hypothesis.
Case 2. Both 1-reductions are external. First, suppose r 0 · · · r k converts to some r , s = r s k+1 · · · s n and t = r t k+1 · · · t n . By the induction hypothesis, there is a u i for each i > k such that s i and t i 1-reduce to u i . So s and t 1-reduce to u = r u k+1 · · · u n .
But there is another possibility, namely that
where the r i 's 1-reduce to s i 's and
where the r i 's 1-reduce to the t i 's fpr i > 1. By the induction hypothesis, s i and t i 1-reduce to some u i for i > 1. Let u = p e (p 0 )s 1 . Then s and t 1-reduce to u u 2 · · · u n . Case 3. One of the 1-reductions, say the 1-reduction of r to s, is external and the other is internal. So r 0 · · · r k CON V r , s = r s k+1 · · · s n , where r i 1-reduces to s i for i > k, and t = t 0 · · · t n , where r i 1-reduces to t i for each i. By Lemma 2, r and t 0 · · · t k 1-reduce to some u . By the induction hypothesis, s i and t i 1-reduce to some u i for i > k. So s and t 1-reduce to
Lemma 4 If r m − RED s and r n − RED t then there is a u such that s n − RED u and t m − RED u.
Proof:
This completes the proof of the Church-Rosser Theorem. 
Proof of the Wellfoundedness Theorem
We want to prove that every term t is wellfounded, i.e. that every sequence
Definition of Computability. We define the notion of a computable term of type A by induction on A.
• A term of atomic type is computable iff it is well-founded.
• A term of type A ∨ B is computable iff it is well-founded and -if it reduces to a term [s, B] , then s is a computable term of type A.
-If it reduces to a term of type [A, s], then s is a computable term of type B.
• A term f of type ∀x : A.F (x) is computable iff f t is a computable term of type F (t) for every computable term t of type A.
• A term p of type ∃x : A.F (x) is computable iff p1 is a computable term of type A and p2 is a computable term of type F (p1).
We define the notion of a c-extension of a term t of type A by induction on A. If A is atomic or a disjunction B ∨ C, then t is the only c-extension of t. If A = ∀x : BF (x), then the c-extensions of t are precisely the c-extensions of ts for all computable terms s : B. If A = ∃x : BF (x), then the c-extensions of t are precisely the c-extensions of t1 and t2. So the c-extensions of t are all the terms of atomic or disjunctive type of the form ts 1 · · · s n , where the s i are either 1, 2 or are computable. Clearly, t is computable iff all of its c-extensions are computable.
The rank |A| of a formula A is defined by The proof is by induction on |A|. a) We need only show that all c-extensions s = vs 1 · · · s n of v are wellfounded. (When s is of type B ∨ C, it cannot reduce to a term of the form [r, C] or [B, r].) The s i which are terms are of types of rank < |A| and so, by the induction hypothesis, are well-founded. It immediately follows that s is well-founded. b) Let s be computable and consider the c-extension t = ss 1 · · · s n of s, where the terms among the s i are variables. t is computable and hence well-founded. So s must be well-founded. c) We need first to show that all c-extensions tt 1 · · · t n of t are wellfounded. But if such a term were not well-founded, then neither would the c-extension st 1 · · · t n of s be, contradicting the computability of s. Secondly, if tt 1 · · · t n reduces to [r, C] or [B, r] , then so does st 1 · · · t n and so r is computable. 2
It follows from b) that in order to prove that every term is well-founded, it suffices to prove that every term is computable. By an c-instance of a term t we will mean any result of replacing each variable throughout t by a computable term of the same type. So by a) above, t is a c-instance of itself.
COMPUTABILITY THEOREM Every c-instance of a term t is computable.
The proof is by induction on t. If t is a variable, this is immediate. If t = rs, where r and s are terms, then by the induction hypothesis, the cinstances of r and s are computable. So any c-instance of t is computable by definition. Similarly, if t = s1 or t = s2, then s is computable by the induction hypothesis, and so t is computable by definition. So we need only consider terms t of the form
Let t be a c-instance of t. Consider any c-extension p = t t 1 · · · t n of t . We need first to show that p is well-founded. Consider a sequence
It will be convenient to assume that, for each k, p k+1 is obtained by converting exactly one occurrence of a subterm of p k . We have first to show that (1) is finite. Recall that if the step from p k to p k+1 is obtained by converting an initial part of p k , i.e.
we call it an external reduction; otherwise, an internal reduction.
Secondly, we must show that, if p reduces to a term of the form [q, B] or [B, q], then q is computable. But, if we have already shown that the sequence (1) is finite, we may assume that its last term p m is normal. But then it follows from the Church-Rosser Theorem that p m is of the form [q, B] or [B, q] (since the only reductions of terms of this form are internal). We need therefore only show that, for each sequence 1), if the last term is of one of these forms, then it is computable.
Given any sequence t 0 , t 1 , . . . of terms, by its >-subsequence, we mean the maximum subsequence t i 0 > t i 1 > . . . .
Let t = N (A, s) and t = N (A, s ). Then p m is of the form
where i is the number of external conversions in the sequence (1) up to p m , st 1 · · · t i RED q m and t j RED q m j for j = i + 1, . . . , n. There can be at most n such external conversions in this sequence. Let p m = N (A, s t 1 · · · t n ). Do for sufficiently large m p m > p m+1 . So if the sequence of p m 's were infinite, so would be the >-subsequence of the p m 's. But s t 1 · · · t n is computable. Hence (1) Let t = (r, s) and t = (r , s ). If there are no external reductions in the sequence of p m 's, then p m = (r m , s m )t m 1 · · · t m n and, since r , s and the terms among the t i 's are computable, the >-subsequences of the r m 's and s m 's are finite; hence so is the sequence of p m 's. Otherwise some p m is of the form r m t 2 · · · t n or s m t 2 · · · t n . But, by the induction hypothesis, r and s are computable. So, for large enough m, p m is computable. If there is an external reduction in the sequence, let the first one be at p k+1 , so that p k = (r k , s k ) and p k+1 = r k or s k . But r RED r k and s RED s k and, by the induction hypothesis, r and s are computable.
Finally, let t = λxs(x) (dropping the type for the sake of brevity). Then t = λxs (x). Again, if there are no external conversions in the sequence of p m 's, then p m = (λxs m (x))t (D ∧ D) ), etc., and (r, s, t)) for (r, (s, t)), (r, s, t, u) for (r, (s, (t, u))), etc. First-order terms are terms of type D built up in the usual way from variables of type D and n-ary first-order function variables, i.e. variables of type
The atomic first-order formulas are either 0 or are of the form R(t 1 , . . . , t n ), where R is a symbol for a propositional function defined on D ∧ · · · ∧ D (n D's) and the t k are first-order terms. The first-order quantifiers are introduced by
So, the first-order formulas are built up from atomic first-order formulas using →, ∧, ∨ and the first-order quantifiers. These are the formulas of HL. The rules of inference of HL are the usual ones of intuitionistic predicate logic, including the rule of inference from 0 to any formula A.
Let ∆ := {D n | n < ω} First-order terms t are built up from variables with signs in ∆; i.e. they are deductions of D from ∆ in CH. Namely, if t is a variable, it is of type D.
where R is defined by the conversion rules R(r, s, 0) CON V r R(r, s, S(t)) CON V stR(r, s, t).
Let t = vt 1 · · · t n , where v is of type D n and the t i are first-order terms. Then each t i is a deduction of D from ∆ and so, by n applications of ∀-elimination, so is t. So all valid formulas of HL are valid in CH under the assumption of ∆. The proof-theoretic version of this is
The proof is routine, 5 by induction on the length of the given deduction of A in HL, except for when the last inference of the deduction is an instance of ∀-elimination or ∃-elimination.
For the first of these, suppose that A = F (t) is obtained in HL from ∀xF (x) = ∀x : D.F (x), where t is a first-order term. As we have just noted, t is a deduction of D from ∆. By the induction hypothesis, there is a deduction s in CH of ∀xF (x) from Γ ∪ ∆. Hence st is the required deduction of A.
For the second, let A be obtained in HL from ∃xF (x) and ∀x(F (x) → A), where v is not in A. By the induction hypothesis, there are deductions p and q in CH of these premises, respectively, from Γ ∪ ∆. So p2 is a deduction of
So, in this sense, CH is an extension of HL. We now need to show that it is conservative (in this sense) over HL, that is that Γ ∪ ∆ CH A implies Γ HL A.
Quasi First-Order Terms and Formulas
Call a term p of CH existential if its type is of the form ∃yG(y). Call a term or formula X of CH quasi-first-order (qfo) iff there is a first-order term or first-order formula X , respectively, called an original of X, and there is a list p 1 , . . . , p n (n ≥ 0) of distinct normal existential terms, called an e-list for X, such that
• the type of p i is obtained by substituting p 1 1, . . . , p i−1 1 for distinct free variables of type D in a first-order formula.
• X is obtained by substituting p 1 1, . . . , p n 1 for distinct free variables in X .
(Note that a qf o term or formula which is not first-order will have infinitely many originals, obtained from one another by renaming free variables.) If X has the e-list p 1 , . . . , p n , then the type of p k for k = 1, . . . , n is qf o and has the e-list p 1 , . . . , p k−1 . If ∀xF (x) and t : D are qf o, then so is F (t). Just concatenate the e-list of p's for ∀xF (x) with the e-list for t. Obviously, if A → B, A ∧ B or A ∨ B is qf o, then so are A and B.
Lemma 6 Let t = vt 1 · · · t n be a term of type A = D, where v is a variable of qf o sign and the terms among the t i are all qf o. Then A is qf o.
The proof is by induction on n. If n = 0, the result is trivial. Assume n > 0 and that vt 0 · · · t n−1 is of qfo type A .
If A is B → C, then A = C and the result is immediate. If A = B ∧ C, then A is B or C and again the result is immediate.
, where t n is of type D and so, by assumption, qf o. Hence, as we noted above, A is qf o.
If A = ∃x.F (x), then t n = 1 or 2. If it is were 1, then A would be D. So it must be 2. A = F (t 0 1 · · · t n−1 1). If p 1 , . . . , p k is a concatenation of an e-list for A and one for t, then p 1 , . . . , p k , t 0 · · · t n−1 is an e-list for A. 2 Lemma 7 Let t be a normal deduction in CH of D from Γ ∪ ∆, where the formulas in Γ are qf o, and assume that t has no subterm parts of the form
The proof is by induction on t. Let t = t 0 t 1 · · · t n , where t 0 is simple. If n = 0, then, since t = N (D, u) and [r, s, u] of type D are excluded, t must be a variable of type D and so is a first-order term. So let n > 0. t 0 must be either a first-order function variable or a variable of first-order sign. In the first case, t 1 , . . . , t n are all normal terms of type D and so, by the induction hypothesis, satisfy the condition. Let p i1 , . . . , p ik i be an e-list for t i . Then p 11 , . . . , p nkn is an e-list for t. Since the originals of all the t i are first-order terms, so are the originals of t.
So assume that t 0 is of first-order type. Then p = t 0 · · · t n−1 must be of type of the form ∃yG(y) and t n = 1. If ∃y.G(y) is qf o with e-list p 1 , . . . , p k , then we are done: p 1 , . . . , p k , p is an e-list for t and the originals of t are variables v D . But, since the terms among t 0 , . . . , t n−1 are qfo by the induction hypothesis, ∃yG(y) is qfo by Lemma 6. 2 Lemma 8 If t is a normal deduction of A from Γ ∪ ∆, where Γ consists of first-order formulas, then every existential term occurring in A is a subterm of t.
(The restriction of Γ to first-order formulas is necessary in virtue of our decision to count a variable v B as an atomic symbol.) For, if B ∈ Γ were to contain an existential term, then v B would be a counterexample to the lemma. The proof is routine by induction on t. There are two cases in which an existential term p may be introduced into a formula: One is A = F (s), where s contains p, t = f s, and f is of type ∀x : B.F (x). The other is A = F (p1), where t = p2 and p : ∃xF (x). 2 Not all formulas derivable from first-order formulas and ∆ are qf o. For example, let v be of sign ∀x∃yF (x, y). Then λx : Dvx2 is a deduction of ∀xF (x, vx1) from ∀x∃yF (x, y). Call a term of CH pure iff the type of each of its subterms is either in ∆ or is qf o. We need to prove that, if there is a deduction t of a qf o formula A from Γ ∪ ∆, where Γ consists of qf o formulas, then there is a pure such deduction. The difficulty in proving this straightforwardly by induction on t arises from the possible presence in t of disjunction-elimination: for example, t might have a subterm of the form [q, r, s] , where the type of q is a non-qf o formula F ∨ G. We shall call such a term [q, r, s] a critical term. When [q, r, s] is a critical term and neither q, r, nor s have critical subterms, we call [q, r, s] a minimal critical subterm.
Lemma 9 Let t be a normal deduction in CH from Γ ∪ ∆ of A, where Γ consists of qf o formulas, and let t = [q, r, s] be a minimal critical term. Then there is a normal deduction t = [q , r , s ] of A from Γ ∪ ∆ which contains no critical subterms (and so is not itself critical).
The proof is by induction of the length |t| of t as a string of symbols. Let q be of type F ∨ G. q cannot be of the form vt 1 · · · t n , since otherwise F ∨ G would be qf o by Lemma 6. It cannot be of the form [p, G] Lemma 10 If Γ ∪ ∆ CH A, where Γ consists of qf o formulas and either A is qf o or else A = D, then there is a pure deduction t in CH of A from Γ ∪ ∆.
Let t be a normal deduction in CH of A from Γ ∪ ∆. The proof is by induction on the number k(t) of critical subterms of t.
Let k(t) = 0. We proceed by induction on t.
We may suppose that t does not contain subterm parts of the form N (D, s), since otherwise the induction hypothesis yields a pure deduction s of 0 and we may take t = N (A, s ). So we have only the following cases:
If t = vt 1 · · · t n ), where the sign of v is in Γ ∪ ∆, the terms among the t i are of type D. So, by Lemma 7, each term t i is qf o. Hence, by Lemma 6, the type A j of vt 1 · · · t j is qf o for j = 1 . . . n. Hence, t = t is pure.
If
, then r is of type D and so, as we have already seen, r = r. Hence s is a pure deduction of F (r ) and so, again, we may set t = (r , s ).
If t = λx : Bs(x), apply the induction hypothesis to the deduction s(v B ) from Γ ∪ ∆ ∪ {B} to obtain s (v B ). Then t = λx : Bs (x). Now assume k(t) > 0. There is a minimal critical subterm [q, r, s] of t. By Lemma 9, we may replace each occurrence of [q, r, s] in t by the corresponding occurrence of a normal term p = [q , r , s ] of the same type with k(p) = 0, obtaining a normal deduction t * of A from Γ ∪ ∆ with k(t * ) < k(t). By the remark above, t * is normal, and so by the induction hypothesis we obtain t = (t * ) . 2
Elimination of Left Projections
If t = λx : B.s(x), then either A = B → C or else B = D and A = ∀xF (x). In the first case, B is qf o and so, by the induction hypothesis, we have Γ ∪ {B } HL C from which follows Γ HL A . In the second case, Γ HL F (v) and hence Γ HL A .
If t = (r, s), then either A = B ∧ C, r : B and s : C or else A = ∃xF (x), x occurs in F (x), r : D and s : F (r). In the first case, Γ HL B and Γ HL C and so Γ HL A . In the second case, Γ HL F (r) . Let ∃xF (x) be an original of ∃xF (x). r is qf o by Lemma 7. Hence, F (r) = F (r ), where r is an original for r. So A = ∃x(F (x) ) follows by ∃-elimination in HL from F (r) . So Γ HL A .
Let t = f s, where s is a term. Then either f : B → A and s : B, in which case the induction hypothesis yields Γ HL B → A and Γ HL B, and so Γ HL A, or else f : ∀xF (x), s : D and A = F (r). In the latter case, r is a normal term of type D and index 0. Hence, it is a term of HL and we have Γ HL ∀xF (x) and so Γ HL A.
If t = pe, where e is 1 or 2. Let p be of existential type ∃xF (x). e = 2, since otherwise A = D. So x is not in F (x), since otherwise A = F (p1) would contain an occurrence of p1 and so t would not have a null base. By the induction hypothesis, Γ HL ∃xA from which Γ HL A follows. Now suppose that p is of type A ∧ B (if e = 1) or B ∧ A (if e = 2). In any case, then, Γ HL A ∧ B and so Γ HL A . 2 7 Completeness of HL Now we are in position to prove that CH is conservative over HL.
CONSERVATION THEOREM Let Γ consist of first-order formulas, let A be qf o with original A and let Γ ∪ ∆ CH A.
Then
Γ HL A .
Let t be a normal pure deduction of A from Γ ∪ ∆. The proof is by induction on the length of the bases of t. Since Γ consists of first-order formulas, it follows from Lemma 8 that every element of a base of t is a subterm of t and hence is pure and normal.
If t has a null base, then A is first-order, i.e. A = A . So the result follows by Lemma 12.
So let t have base p, p 1 , . . . , p n and let A = A(p1) and let p be of type ∃xG(x). Since p, p 1 , . . . , p n is a base, ∃xG(x) contains no existential terms, and so is first-order. Since p is pure and normal and has a null base,
by Lemma 12. p 1 , . . . , p n are pure and normal, and so by Lemma 11, there is a pure normal deduction t of A(v D ) from Γ ∪ ∆ ∪ {G(v D )} with base p 1 , . . . , p n . By the induction hypothesis, we therefore have Γ ∪ {G(v)} HL A.
So, by ∃-elimination in HL, Γ HL A. 2
